

# There's Something Stuck In My Shoe!

Reflections on the adoption of fine and course grained authorization frameworks

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# Outline

# Technology Transfer

- Metrics of Success

# Usable Security Touchpoints

-Outside & Inside

# Your Customers' (Technical) Goals

# Examples:

- -Java Standard Edition
- -Java Enterprise Edition
- -Web 2.0 Mashups
- Final Thoughts

## Technology Transfer

- Ideas papers, patents, concepts, tutorials, standards, …
- Implementation code, pseudo code, …
- Assists tools, components, …

# How do <u>you</u> define successful technology transfer???

# Example *Metrics of Success* – IBM Research Metrics

### Technical accomplishments

- What did you do that was new and / or interesting / useful?
- Contributions to the company's products & services

### External impact

- People buying your products and services
- Professional activities, including
  - Publications, presentations, standards, patents, open source, etc.
- Leadership and teamwork

# Example *Metrics of Success* – Technology Transfer

- Technical accomplishments
  - What did you do that was new and / or interesting / useful?

### Contributions to the company's products & services

- External impact on "customers"
  - People buying your products and services
  - Professional activities, including
    - Publications, presentations, standards, patents, open source, etc.
- Leadership and teamwork

### Usable Security Touch Points – Outside & Inside

### End-user experience

- Mobile device
- Interactive Voice Response (IVR)
- Web
- Applications

### **Programming models**

- Used to implement systems (e.g., see above)
- Security models *bleeds through* to the end-user experience
  - userid/password (basic auth), session tokens, OpenID, OAuth, PKI (e.g., PGP, SSL, HTTPS, WS-\*), kerberos, LDAP, Active Directory,...

### What Are Your Customers' (Technical) Goals?



How much <u>value</u> do they assign to security?

What are they willing to spend? One time? Ongoing?



# **Java Standard Edition**



## Java Standard Edition

- Write Once, Run Anywhere (WORA)
- Reference monitors protects sensitive resources access
  - Network, file system, Java runtime resources, ...
  - Principles: CodeSource: {URL, digital signature on the code}
  - Authorization: Stack-based "introspection"
- Two contrasting models for authorization policy specification:
  - Netscape's browser required Applets to embed security policy calls / pop-ups
    - Based on Java 1.x security
    - Complex security manager logic
    - "Breaks" applications when the Java runtime patched
  - Sun required editing of a *textual* policy database
    - Elegant and far simpler security policy evaluation
- Either way, end-users required to be security administrators

## Policies for the Sun reference implementation

### Embed security policies in the application JAR file

- Eventually implemented by OSGi
- Proposed: have Applet framework prompt whether to accept or modify the embedded policies

### Begs the question:

- How to construct the policy file(s)?
- Very hard for for large ("real world") applications

## Policies for the Sun reference implementation

### Dynamic option:

- Run the code and see what Permission(s) are required and build the database from this list
  - Inspect the call stack when authorizations are required
- Cover only paths through the code that are covered by the test case(s)

## Static Analysis: Tools To The Rescue!

#### Created security analysis algorithms & tools

- Java 2 Permission Analysis
  - Identify the Permission(s), including the object and operation(s)
  - Call path analysis (goal: sound/complete analysis, not too conservative)
  - Automaticlly identify AccessController.doPrivileged() call placement
- Other security analyses
  - E.g., mutability / constants, scope reduction (public, protected, private)
- Code signing
- Etc.

#### Packaging

- Text / HTML
- Eclipse IDE integration <u>SWORD4J</u>
  - Permission Analysis++

### Substantially reduced the "cost" of Java security analysis

Ongoing maintenance costs

### Successfully applied to several products

- Either
  - Required compliance or needed for competitive reasons, or
  - Desire for tighter security customer demand

### Lessons Learned

#### Naïve assumptions

- Products would *want* or *need* Java security - willing to expend required resources

#### Some products adopted Java security

- Were motivated standards/compliance, customer demand
- Having prior working relationship with the development group was very helpful
- Tooling made "Java security enablement" tractable (feasible, affordable)
- Target "product" must have sufficient interest
  - Can be harder in the Open Source community
    - Even with "free" tools
- For server-side, composite / dynamically loaded applications were not a concern
  - Wrong security model for enterprise (web) applications

### Too expensive to maintain secure Java code

- Even for the right target system, "costs" can be overwhelming if not sufficiently motivated
- See "Making Security Accessible to Programmers: Lessons Learned"

### **Net Results: Mixed Success**


### Limited adoption of Java security

- Needed for compliance and/or meet customer demand
- Adopters generally violate the Principle of Least Privilege
  - Large parts of the code base are assigned *AllPermission*

### But too expensive to maintain

- Model is too far complex (e.g., stack introspection, taint analysis, ...)
- Time consuming, even with tools
  - First time. Every time code changes.
- Tools have limitations soundness and completeness, measurable
- Leaves some products with less security that is desirable
- Web application security has comparable cost / complexity
- SWORD4J is available (free) via IBM's alphaWorks web site

# **Java Enterprise Edition**



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## Java Enterprise Edition

#### Multi-company effort

- Excellent working relationship with "standards" group
- Standards group motivate to have a "secure" standard

#### Access control on function, not data (!)

- Role-based
- URI's, EJB methods course-grained authorization
- Much, much simpler model
  - Even so, could get complex for "real world" web sites

#### Data protection – declaratively specified

- Declarative specification of authentication (none, basic auth, forms based auth)
- Channel security integrity, confidentiality

#### Specification only

- No reference implementation
  - Sun Microsystems produced one?
- Implementation up to the compliant vendors

#### Usability is (largely) up to the implementing vendors

- E.g., based on use cases

# Advice From a Wise Sage

### • A non-security mentor's advise:

- If it is in the standard, it must be implemented

### • However,

- Be careful what you wish for

### Lessons Learned

#### Success!

- Demand for security
- Very good working relationship with the standards and product teams
- Role-based access control in the specification
- Implemented by all JEE compliant vendors

#### However,

- Function-centered authorization
  - Many (most?) authorization use cases are around data access
    - E.g., access to your bank account, not any bank account
    - - Against the intent of the specification, no reasonable alternatives afforded by specification
      - > Data-centric authorization proposals never became part of the specification
- In practice, few roles are defined
  - Possible violation of the principle of least privileged
- There are security vulnerabilities in the web programming model
  - E.g., injection attacks (not unique to Enterprise Java)

#### Design by committee has limitations

• Usable (and complete) security may not be a priority

# Web 2.0 Mashup Security



## Web 2.0 Mashup Security

### • Web 2.0 and *mashups* were, in general, considered insecure

- "Best Practices" encouraged bypassing security
  - Bypass browser Same Origin Policy using a proxy server
  - Insecure handling of identity, credentials and delegation

### Objectives:

- Secure cross-domain mashups, sharing of state, at "the glass"
  - Secure by default
  - Minimize programmer knowledge about (browser) security
- Avoid fine-grained (Java Standard Edition) authorization
  - Too complicated, requiring fancy tools, high on-going maintenance costs
- Coarse-grained authorization
  - Get as close to the data as is possible without burdening the programmer
- Work in existing browsers
  - Critical mass (end-users) needed to be a commercially viable technology

## Web 2.0 Mashup Security

### Selected a standards group: OpenAjax Alliance

- Proposed a simple security model based on existing programming model – *pub-sub*
- Confirmed that it was compatible with existing development model
  - Extended existing programming model with security "under the covers"
- Worked in a multi-company task force to get buy-in for new security model

### Provided a reference implementation

- Available via SourceForge

### Identify product groups needing the technology

- Done in parallel with the standards activity
- Grounded the work in customer security needs
- Identify product-based advocates with influence
  - Senior management that recognizes the security need
  - Technical staff who can execute on the vision and integrate into product

### Lessons Learned

- Focused on the user community (developers) the Standard
  - Got active participation from the (developer) community
    - Attention paid to their tolerance for the hoops that must be jumped
  - Simple conceptual design
    - Alan Kay: Simple things should be simple, complex things should be possible
  - Secure by default
- Maintained contact with the standards group and implementers to ensure forward progress
  - Follow the community if it shifts direction
    - OpenAjax → OpenSocial → ???
- Released open source reference implementation on SourceForge
- No strong (and secure) competition
  - Repeatedly get out the message that there is a secure alternative for mashups
    - It is consistent with other strategic directions in the organization
- Worked the corporate politics to gain a toehold and maintain forward progress
  - Found champions in the product and development groups
    - Took advantage of "soap box" opportunities to advertise the work
  - Grounded in customer-drive use cases that mattered
  - Maintained regular contact with the internal development community
- Low cost to implement in product AND maintain its security

## **Final Thoughts**

#### Security technology transfer is difficult

- Seems similar experiences to HCI
- Who are your allies in support of the "business"?
  - What motivates them to adopt your security? What is the value to your "customer"?
    - Customer demand?
    - Standards?
    - Reputation risk?
    - How do they assess the cost / benefit tradeoff?
  - Who are your strongest champions? Business? Technology?
    - Do you have scenarios that can be validated with customers?
    - Who is the right customer? What is their feedback? Have you talked to them?
      - <u>Really</u> listen to their feedback! Understand their viewpoint. The real security issues may be elsewhere.
      - How does your technology fit into their business model? A cost? Provide value-add? Risk mitigation?
  - What is the competition?
    - What are the natural affordances\* of your technology?
      - How good a fit is the technology to the deployment environment?
      - Who is to use the technology? How well does it match their skills, job, business needs?
      - How do the costs / value of your technology compare to the competition? What are the alternatives?
  - Are there related standards or standards groups to support your effort?
    - Are their goals in alignment with your technology (technology and business)?
    - Who is driving the effort? What are their strategic and tactical goals?
    - How broad based is their support? Is it thriving? What are the tactical & strategic risks to adoption?

#### How do you line up your supporters?

\* "Affordances" as interpreted by Don Norman

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