Balancing Usability and Security in a Video CAPTCHA

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Overview

- Motivation + Brief History
- Desirable CAPTCHA Properties
- Video CAPTCHA + Research Goal
- Methodology
  - Data sources
  - Generating + Grading Challenges
- Attack Simulation
- Two User Studies
- Results + Comparison to Existing Work

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Motivation: Abuse of Online Services

Generate accounts to abuse free services

Send SPAM from free email accounts

Take advantage of free offers

Buy hundreds of tickets for scalpers

Brute force passwords

Post spam to blogs

Poison online polls

QUICKVOTE

Which is the best Computer Science Grad School in the US?

Berkeley	○	MIT	○
CMU	○	Princeton	○
Cornell	○	Stanford	○

vote

Desirable CAPTCHA Properties

Automated

- The generation and grading of challenges is automatic

Open

- Underlying databases/algorithms are publicly available

*Usable**

- Frequently passed by humans

*Secure**

- Frequently failed by machines

"*A CAPTCHA is a program that can generate and grade tests that it itself cannot pass (much like some professors).*" -Luis von Ahn

Existing CAPTCHA Types

Natural language processing

- “What is 4 times the number of legs a kangaroo has?”

Character recognition

- “Type the letters you see in this image.”

Image understanding

- “What are these images of?” / “Is this image upright?”

Automatic speech recognition

- “1-6-3-9-2-7” / Old radio broadcasts

Character Recognition-based



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Image Recognition-based





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Video CAPTCHA

Task:

Submit three tags, aiming to match one in a set of automatically generated ground truth tags.

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Public Video Dataset: YouTube.com

Generate a random YouTube ID…Good luck

- 64 possible characters; 11 characters long
- > 150 million videos on YouTube (August 2008)

Random walk (randomized local search)

- Query with a dictionary* word
- Randomly choose a video
- Randomly choose a tag
- Repeat for a random depth
  - [1, 100]



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Generating Challenges

Use random walk to select a challenge video

From Related Videos set, add *n* additional tags (sorted by cosine similarity over tag sets)

- *black box* algorithm (hard* to compute it ourselves)

Remove tags estimated to be more frequent than a threshold *t*

$$\textsc{Sim}(A, B) = \cos\theta = \frac{A \cdot B}{\|A\|\|B\|}$$

$$\cos\theta = \frac{|A_t \cap R_t|}{\sqrt{|A_t|}\sqrt{|R_t|}}$$

Tag Frequency Distribution



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Estimated Tag Frequencies

n	Tag	Count	Frequency
1	music	4880	5.65%
2	video	4110	4.75%
3	live	2904	3.36%
4	rock	2680	3.10%
5	funny	2273	2.63%
6	de*	2021	2.33%
7	love	1810	2.09%
8	dance	1734	2.00%
9	new	1707	1.97%
10	world	1563	1.80%
11	guitar	1548	1.79%
12	2007*	1518	1.75%
13	2008*	1499	1.73%
14	rap	1434	1.66%
15	tv*	1409	1.63%
16	comedy	1378	1.59%
17	game	1374	1.59%
18	show	1350	1.56%
19	movie	1312	1.51%
20	episode	1310	1.51%

Random walk of 86k YouTube videos

Many tags do not appear in our original dictionary

Grading Challenges

Normalize Input

- Lowercase, no punctuation or stop words, only 3 tags

Stemming

- Add word stems to ground truth (Porter algorithm)
- Adds at most 3 additional tags (‘dogs’ -> ‘dog’)

Levenshtein Edit Distance

- Allows for insertions, deletions, and substitutions
- Normalized threshold of 0.8

$$\textsc{NormalizedLevenshtein}(s_1, s_2) = 1.0 - \frac{\textsc{Levenshtein}(s_1, s_2)}{\textsc{Max}(|s_1|, |s_2|)}$$

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Testing the Hypothesis

One may increase *usability* while maintaining *security* against a frequency-based attack in a video CAPTCHA by intelligently extending the set of *user-supplied* and *ground truth* tags.

n	Number of related tags added.
t	Pruning threshold.
s	Use stemming?
l	Use inexact match?

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Attack Tags Used

t	Best Attack Tags	# Pruned	$\hat{S}_c(A)$
1.0	[music, video, live]	0	0.1377
0.01	[dj, remix, vs]	37	0.0291
0.009	[girl, school, el]	44	0.0256
0.008	[animation, michael, star]	49	0.0237
0.007	[concert, news, day]	67	0.0207
0.006	[fantasy, dragon, rb]	92	0.0179
0.005	[islam, humor, blues]	129	0.0148
0.004	[real, bass, 12]	184	0.0120
0.003	[uk, spoof, pro]	302	0.0090
0.002	[seven, jr, patrick]	570	0.0060
0.001	[ff, kings, ds]	1402	0.0030

Attack Success Rates: Random Walk

(against 5000 videos)



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Two User Studies

Emails, flyers, word of mouth

Number of participants

- User Study 1:
  - 233 -> 143 (61.3%)
- User Study 2:
  - 300 -> 184 (61.3%)

Online collection

	User Study 1	User Study 2
Age group		
18-24	74.82% (107)	77.71% (143)
25-34	13.28% (19)	11.95% (22)
35-44	3.496% (5)	4.891% (9)
45-54	4.195% (6)	2.173% (4)
55-65	2.797% (4)	2.717% (5)
65-74	0.699% (1)	0.543% (1)
75+	0.699% (1)	0.0% (0)
Gender		
Male	79.02% (113)	83.69% (154)
Female	20.97% (30)	16.30% (30)
Highest level of education completed		
Some High School	0.0% (0)	0.543% (1)
High School	2.797% (4)	4.891% (9)
Some College	46.85% (67)	47.82% (88)
Associate's	4.895% (7)	6.521% (12)
Bachelor's	33.56% (48)	30.43% (56)
Master's	11.18% (16)	4.347% (8)
Professional Degree	0.699% (1)	0.0% (0)
PhD	0.0% (0)	5.434% (10)
Number of online videos watched per month		
0-4	17.48% (25)	17.93% (33)
5-14	30.76% (44)	30.43% (56)
15-30	23.07% (33)	20.65% (38)
31+	28.67% (41)	30.97% (57)
Have you ever uploaded a video before?		
Yes	60.83% (87)	64.67% (119)
No	39.16% (56)	35.32% (65)

Human Success Rates: Manual Selection

(First User Study)



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Human Success Rates: Random Walk

(Second User Study)



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Completion Times and User Feedback

Completion times (in seconds)

- User Study 1: median = 20.6 (μ = 29.7, σ = 34.7)
- User Study 2: median = 17.1 (μ = 22.0, σ = 23.6)

Which task is faster?

- User Study 1: 16%: neither, **64%: text**, 20%: video
- User Study 2: 13%: neither, **60%: text**, 27%: video

Which task is more enjoyable?

- User Study 1: 23%: no pref, 15%: text, **62%: video**
- User Study 2: 22%: no pref, 20%: text, **58%: video**

Comparison with Existing Work

CAPTCHA	Type	Success Rates Human	Machine
Microsoft	Text-based	0.90 [3]	0.60 [28]
Baffletext	Text-based	0.89 [4]	0.25 [4]
Handwritten	Text-based	0.76 [23]	0.13 [23]
ASIRRA	Image-based	0.99 [6]	0.10 [9]
Video	$\tau = \langle 15, 0.003, \mathrm{T}, \mathrm{T} \rangle$	0.77	0.02
	$\tau = \langle 25, 0.006, \mathrm{T}, \mathrm{T} \rangle$	0.86	0.05
	$\tau = \langle 90, 0.006, \mathrm{T}, \mathrm{T} \rangle$	0.90	0.13

Perhaps not a replacement,

but an alternative?

Conclusions

First video-based CAPTCHA and it is:

- *Automated*
- *Open*
- *Usable*
- *Secure*

Usability/security tradeoff

Pass rates are comparable to existing CAPTCHAs

~60% of participants reported that Video CAPTCHAs were more enjoyable than text-based CAPTCHAs

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Future Work

Collaborative filtering to improve ground truth tags

- Improve existing tags on poorly labeled videos

Computer vision attacks

- Detect text in video frames, recognize it, submit it

Content-based Video Retrieval attacks

- Look for similar videos in database + submit their tags

Audio analysis attacks

- Extract important words from video + submit them

Further user studies with audio-only or video-only

Thank You

Online Demonstration:

http://sudbury.cs.rit.edu/

Thanks to

Google

xerox

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Questions?

Image Credit: xkcd.com