21- Making Anonymity Tools Usable

Lujo Bauer, Nicolas Christin and Abby Marsh

March 30, 2016

05-436 / 05-836 / 08-534 / 08-734 / 19-534 / 19-734 Usable Privacy and Security Carnegie Mellon University CyLab

institute for SOFTWARE RESEARCH

Engineering & Public Policy



Today!

- General discussion of anonymity
- An introduction to Tor
- Attempts to help users achieve anonymity
- A design activity to communicate guarantees to users

Why is anonymity valuable?

Why do people criticize censorship?

Press censorship in practice



FREEDOM OF THE PRESS WORLDWIDE IN 2014

Techniques for censoring the Internet

- Methods (see, e.g., Aryan et al. FOCI '13):
 - DNS hijacking / prefix hijacking
 - HTTP header (host and keyword) filtering
 - Connection throttling on SSH
 - Physical threats
 - Dropping HTTPS / TLS traffic
 - IP, Keyword, DNS poisoning
 - Deep packet inspection
 - Active probes against Tor bridges
 - Self-censorship (chilling effect)

Techniques for being anonymous

- Encrypt everything
- Use onion routing to communicate
- OTR messaging
- Don't use services that track you

Tor

• Tor

- "The Onion Router"
- "Tor's Onion Routing"
- Deployed anonymizing overlay network •
 - Running since October 2003
 - 6,000+ relays, 3,000+ bridges on five continents
 - Nodes are regular PCs for the most part ran by volunteers
 In excess of 2,000,000 users (2015)
- Three main functions of interest to us
 - Circuit establishment
 - Circuit usage
 - Hidden services



[Dingledine et al., 2004]

Client first gets IP address of possible Tor entry nodes from directory server



Client

[Dingledine et al., 2004]

Client first gets IP address of possible Tor entry nodes from directory server





[Dingledine et al., 2004]

• Client proxy establishes session key+circuit w/ Onion Router 1



[Dingledine et al., 2004]

- Client proxy establishes session key+circuit w/ Onion Router 1
- Proxy tunnels through that circuit to extend to Onion Router 2



[Dingledine et al., 2004]

- Client proxy establishes session key+circuit w/ Onion Router 1
- Proxy tunnels through that circuit to extend to Onion Router 2



[Dingledine et al., 2004]

 Once circuit is established, applications connect and communicate over Tor circuit



- Hidden server uses Tor to contact 3 "introduction points" (Tor relays)
- Server upload Introduction Points info to DB serven





- Client hears about hidden server, gets introduction points from DB
- Client sets up rendez-vous point (3rd node of a circuit built by client)



 Client tells hidden server about Rendez-Vous Point by contacting one of the Introduction Points and asking them to relay message to server



- Client communicate with hidden server through rendez-vous point from then on
- 6 hops (3 picked by client, including RP, 3 picked by server)



What does Tor protect against?

What does Tor NOT protect against?

Threats Against Tor

- Vulnerabilities in the protocol
- Vulnerabilities in the implementation
- Adversaries controlling large parts of the network and analyzing traffic/timing
- Vulnerabilities on the user's end
 E.g., old version of Firefox
- Human error on the part of the user
- Not enough users! (no hiding in the crowd) 21

Making anonymity usable (example)

- Tor browser bundle
- TAILS (The Amnesic Incognito Live System)
- OTR (off-the-record) messaging tools

Why Johnny Can't Blow the Whistle

- Identify stop-points in Tor Browser Bundle
- Highlight the security reason behind delays
- Combine Vidalia control window & browser
- Change icon
- Direct users to the right OS version

Design activity

- Imagine you have a friend who is unfortunately poor in his/her ability to communicate anonymously
- Tell them everything s/he needs to know to browse the web anonymously and submit information to a whistleblower site
 - What should s/he be worried about?
 - What guarantees does s/he have?
- Deliverable: outline of your advice