

# 22- Making Anonymity Tools Usable

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*Usable Privacy and Security*

**Carnegie  
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**Engineering &  
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# Today!

- General discussion of anonymity
- An introduction to Tor
- Attempts to help users achieve anonymity
- A design activity to communicate guarantees to users

# Why is anonymity valuable?

# Why do people criticize censorship?



# Techniques for censoring the Internet


- Methods (see, e.g., Aryan et al. FOCI '13):
  - DNS hijacking / prefix hijacking
  - HTTP header (host and keyword) filtering
  - Connection throttling on SSH
  - Physical threats
  - Dropping HTTPS / TLS traffic
  - IP, Keyword, DNS poisoning
  - Deep packet inspection
  - Active probes against Tor bridges
  - Self-censorship (chilling effect)

# Techniques for being anonymous

- Encrypt everything
- Use onion routing to communicate
- OTR messaging
- Don't use services that track you

# Overview of Tor



- The Onion Router (Tor)
  - Onion routing introduced by U.S. Naval Research Labs ~ 20 years ago
  - Dingledine, Matthewson, Syverson introduced Tor in a USENIX Security paper in '04






# How Tor works (graphics from EFF)

## How Tor Works: 1



# How Tor works (graphics from EFF)

## How Tor Works: 2



Alice



Step 2: Alice's Tor client picks a random path to destination server. **Green links** are encrypted, **red links** are in the clear.



Jane




Dave



Bob

# How Tor works (graphics from EFF)

## How Tor Works: 3




Alice



Step 3: If at a later time, the user visits another site, Alice's tor client selects a second random path. Again, **green links** are encrypted, **red links** are in the clear.



Dave



Jane



Bob

# How Tor works

# What does Tor protect against?

What does Tor NOT protect against?

# Threats Against Tor

- Vulnerabilities in the protocol
- Vulnerabilities in the implementation
- Adversaries controlling large parts of the network and analyzing traffic/timing
- Vulnerabilities on the user's end
  - E.g., old version of Firefox
- Human error on the part of the user
- Not enough users! (no hiding in the crowd) <sup>15</sup>

# Making anonymity usable (example)

- Tor browser bundle
- TAILS (The Amnesic Incognito Live System)
- OTR (off-the-record) messaging tools



# Why Johnny Can't Blow the Whistle

- Identify stop-points in Tor Browser Bundle
- Highlight the security reason behind delays
- Combine Vidalia control window & browser
- Change icon
- Direct users to the right OS version

# Design activity

- Imagine you have a friend, Rich, who is unfortunately poor in his ability to communicate anonymously
- Tell him everything he needs to know to browse the web anonymously and submit information to a whistleblower site
  - What should he be worried about?
  - What guarantees does he have?
- Deliverable: outline of your advice