



09- Passwords

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Usable Privacy and Security

What is a password?


- Today: a password is a series of characters that authenticates a user
 - Vs. graphical passwords, etc.
 - Vs. unlock patterns
 - Vs. PINS (are they different?)

How passwords should be stored

- Password: *monkeyprincess*
- Hashed (using md5 in this example)
4f83051773ad6eaa0afd1f01fe326c07
 - Problem: rainbow tables can be used
- Better: salted and hashed passwords
 - Generate random string (salt) for each person
 - hash(password|salt) or equivalent
 - Use a slow hash (PBKDF or bcrypt), not md5!


Passwords are useless.
Discuss.

People are predictable (iPhone PINs)




Joseph Bonneau, Sören Preibusch and Ross Anderson. A birthday present every eleven wallets? The security of customer-chosen banking PINs. FC '12

People are predictable (Rockyou)




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
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
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Advances in password cracking

- Online attack: submit guesses to a server
 - Targeted attacks (knowledge about the person) are more effective
- Offline attack: get a list of hashes (and salts) from a site's password database
 - Shorter passwords, unsalted passwords, fast hash functions → can be brute forced!
 - Make a guess, hash the guess, and check to see if it matches the hash

Attackers can guess quickly

- oclHashcat on Ubuntu 13.04 64 bit, Catalyst 13.11b, 1x AMD hd7970
 - 8,089,000,000 guesses/second for MD5
 - 2,510,000,000 guesses/second for SHA1
 - 142,000,000 guesses/second for SHA3
 - 131,000 guesses/second for WPA/WPA2

<http://hashcat.net/oclhashcat/>

Ways of guessing passwords

- Wordlists and mangling rules
 - John the Ripper
 - Hashcat (oclHashcat uses GPUs)
- Markov chains
- Probabilistic context-free grammar
- These all rely on training data

Leaks

- RockYou, a maker of social games (Gourmet Ranch, Zoo World) had 32 million passwords stolen in 2009
 - Plaintext passwords!
- Smaller breaches happen all the time
 - Sometimes plaintext
 - Sometimes hashed (and sometimes salted)
 - Sometimes encrypted

Leaks

- Adobe (2013)
 - Encrypted
 - ECB mode

HACKERS RECENTLY LEAKED **153 MILLION** ADOBE USER EMAILS, ENCRYPTED PASSWORDS, AND PASSWORD HINTS.

ADOBE ENCRYPTED THE PASSWORDS IMPROPERLY, MISUSING BLOCK-MODE 3DES. THE RESULT IS SOMETHING WONDERFUL:

USER	PASSWORD	HINT	
4e18acc1ab27a2d6		WEATHER VANE SWORD	<input type="text"/>
4e18acc1ab27a2d6			<input type="text"/>
4e18acc1ab27a2d6	a0a2876eb1ea1fca	NAME 1	<input type="text"/>
8babbb6299e06eb6d		DUH	
8babbb6299e06eb6d	a0a2876eb1ea1fca		<input type="text"/>
8babbb6299e06eb6d	85e9da81a3a78adc	57	
4e18acc1ab27a2d6		FAVORITE OF 12 APOSTLES	
1ab29ae86da6e5ca	7a246a0a2876eb1e	WITH YOUR OWN HAND YOU HAVE DONE ALL THIS	
a1f9b2b6299e7a2b	eadec1e6ab797397	SEXY EARLOBES	<input type="text"/>
a1f9b2b6299e7a2b	617ab027727ad85	BEST TOS EPISODE	<input type="text"/>
39738b7adb0b8af7	617ab027727ad85	SUGARLAND	
1ab29ae86da6e5ca		NAME + JERSEY #	
877ab7889d3862b1		ALPHA	<input type="text"/>
877ab7889d3862b1			<input type="text"/>
877ab7889d3862b1			<input type="text"/>
877ab7889d3862b1			<input type="text"/>
877ab7889d3862b1		OBVIOUS	<input type="text"/>
877ab7889d3862b1		MICHAEL JACKSON	
38a7c9279cadeb44	9dca1d79d4dec6d5		
38a7c9279cadeb44	9dca1d79d4dec6d5	HE DID THE MASH, HE DID THE	<input type="text"/>
38a7c9279cadeb44		PURLOINED	<input type="text"/>
o8ae5745a7b7af7a	9dca1d79d4dec6d5	FAV. LATER-3 POKEMON	

<http://xkcd.com/1286/>

THE GREATEST CROSSWORD PUZZLE
IN THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD

Leaks

- Common passwords in Adobe breach include 123456, 123456789, password, adobe123, 12345678, qwerty, photoshop, abc123, adobe1, macromedia, azerty, iloveyou, aaaaaaa, 666666, letmein, monkey, princess, dragon, adobe adobe, chocolate,...

Passwords are useful.
Discuss.

Evaluating authentication schemes

- Usability = effortless to remember, nothing to carry, easy to learn, infrequent errors, etc.
- Deployability = accessible, server compatible, cheap, non-proprietary, etc.
- Security = resists physical observation, resistant to throttled/unthrottled guessing, unlinkable, resistant to internal observation

				Usability	Deployability	Security
(Incumbent)	Web passwords	III	[13]	● ● ● ○ ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ●
Password managers	Firefox	IV-A	[22]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	LastPass		[42]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
Proxy	URRSA	IV-B	[5]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	Impostor		[23]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
Federated	OpenID	IV-C	[27]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	Microsoft Passport		[43]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	Facebook Connect		[44]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	BrowserID		[45]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	OTP over email		[46]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
Graphical	PCCP	IV-D	[7]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	PassGo		[47]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
Cognitive	GrIDSure (original)	IV-E	[30]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	Weinshall		[48]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	Hopper Blum		[49]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	Word Association		[50]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
Paper tokens	OTPW	IV-F	[33]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	S/KEY		[32]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	PIN+TAN		[51]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
Visual crypto	PassWindow		[52]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
Hardware tokens	RSA SecurID	IV-G	[34]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	YubiKey		[53]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	IronKey		[54]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	CAP reader		[55]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	Pico		[8]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
Phone-based	Phoolproof	IV-H	[36]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	Cronto		[56]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	MP-Auth		[6]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	OTP over SMS		[57]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	Google 2-Step		[57]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
Biometric	Fingerprint	IV-I	[38]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	Iris		[39]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	Voice		[40]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
Recovery	Personal knowledge		[58]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	Preference-based		[59]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●
	Social re-auth.		[60]	● ● ● ● ● ●	● ● ● ● ● ●	○ ● ● ● ● ●

● = offers the benefit; ○ = almost offers the benefit; no circle = does not offer the benefit.

||| = better than passwords; || = worse than passwords; no background pattern = no change.

Joseph Bonneau, Cormac Herley, Paul C. van Oorschot, Frank Stajano. The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes. Oakland '12

The anatomy of a password study (demo)