

# Poster: Mobile Security for Dummies: Designing Mobile Security Interfaces for the Non-Expert

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

User Interface (UI) designers are constantly challenged by the diversity of the user they attempt to serve and the typically limited resources for developing said interface [9]. Predictive human performance modelling can provide the UI designer with a “crystal ball” to see the future of a design expressed as a quantitative measure. The rapid evolution of mobile platforms puts pressure on UI designers to rapidly and accurately predict usability [19].

Mobile devices increase the convenience of computing, and also the variety of an individual user’s computing experience [14]. The novice user is a significant and enduring portion of the target user community [7]. Security interfaces continually evolve in response to new more sophisticated security threats [15]. Though the users may develop familiarity and expertise with the target functionality of the mobile device or application, each iteration of more complex authentication strips them of their expertise with the security interface [7].

## 2. BACKGROUND

Compared to traditional workstation, mobile devices have three major resource constraints: power, form factors, and user expertise. To be mobile, the devices must run from a portable and renewable power source, such as a battery. The battery life is an important measure of user satisfaction. UI design that accelerates the drain of battery life reduces the usability of the device [10]. Mobile devices must be small enough and light enough to carry easily. The screens must be big enough to use but small enough to fit in pocket or purse because users manipulate the devices in a variety of settings, often while away from a formal workstation [12, 16].

Computer systems and especially mobile devices [15] have moved outside the context of business and research organizations to become essential in the home. Without a formal organization to compensate for individual user deficiencies, the applications themselves must have reduced complexity.

Usable security on the mobile device requires a resource conservation priority over the organizational bias of previous design principles developed for the workstation [5]. Moving UI design principles developed for the traditional workstation to the mobile platform has produced mixed results [13]. In the traditional workstation environment of an organization ignoring security-usability principles has minor consequences [2]. In the resource-constrained mobile device ignoring the consequences compromises the practical functionality of the device.

Keystroke-Level Modelling (KLM) predicts the amount of time an expert user will take to execute typical tasks with a UI. Amendment of the Keystroke-Level-Modeling protocols, particularly in the area of security interfaces, have been necessary

to accommodate the reality of mobile [4]. In the context of expert users KLM assessment of user interactions commonly combines a mental effort operator with physical operator (s) to describe an operation block [1, 11]. However for the novice or less technology literate, the mental effort may vary within that sequence of mental and physical actions [7]. Consequently, this research measures the mental effort separately from physical.

Previous research on novice users focused on target functionality of an application. Information discovery about the interface is the antithesis of the goal of most security interfaces [8]. A security interface has additional usability challenge because it is seen as interruption of the user’s progress towards the primary task [6].

## 3. THE STUDY

The objective of this research was to identify quantitative measurements for mobile security-usability at the design stage for the novice user. Unusable mobile security can result in the user avoiding the device to avoid the experience [18] or turning off the security.. Within the study the following research questions are examined.

- Can current predictive human performance modelling tools identify the expenditure of particular types of effort related to non-workstation design problems?
- Can current predictive human performance modelling be adapted to provide design feedback for non-expert users?

The study uses CogTools, a KLM based predictive human performance modelling tool that models the complexity of an application interface based on wireframes of the planned screens, and a mapping of the flow between these screens [9]. The current version of Cogtools predicts how much time an expert user will take to execute typical tasks with a UI [20].

Amendment of the KLM is necessary to adjust for the reality of mobile [4], particularly for security. KLM assessment of user interactions commonly combines a mental effort operator with physical operator (s) to describe an operation block [1]. However for the novice or less technology literate, the mental effort may vary within that sequence of mental and physical actions [7]. This research separates mental from physical effort.

### 3.1 Methodology

The study uses Design Science Research (DSR) methodology as illustrated in Figure 1. In DSR an artifact is built or created to validate the proposed model. The artifact was a set of rules to tag the actions CogTools analyzes. The rules identify constrained resources, such as cognitive effort and mobile form factors. For this study the tagged actions, seen in TABLE 1, were chosen based on the literature on mobile security interfaces and novice users.




Figure 1: DSR used in Cogtools study

### 3.2 Procedure and Preliminary Results

Three versions of the security interface to a mobile web application were created with varying amounts of user cognitive effort and screen interactions. The security interface used basic authentication, which is the most common authentication on both workstation and mobile [3]. Four use cases for navigating each version of the security interface, seen in Table 2 were used to create wireframes. When mapping the wireframes in the CogTools software, each action described in Table 1 was tagged.

TABLE 1: Actions consuming constrained resources

Resource	Action consuming constrained resource
Form Factor	On-screen Keystrokes [11] Screen Touch/Swipe [1] Button pushes [4]
User effort	Free recall of a piece of information [17] Cued recall of information [7]

The CogTools score was generated for the overall design of each version. Then scores were generated for all actions related to form factors, and scores for all actions related to user cognitive effort. A pilot study revealed a need to add the additional criteria of “success” for the next iteration of the study. An interface with a low CogTools score for complexity, but results in failure in three out of four use cases is not desirable.

TABLE 2: Use Cases in Basic Authentication

Use Case	Knows UID	Knows Password
1	Yes	Yes
2	Yes	No
3	No	Yes
4	No	No

### 3.3 Discussion

This research challenges the current bias toward the expert user for usability particularly in the area of security interfaces. The research also explores the concept that usability of a security interface is separate and has different design priorities than the software the security is protecting. Additional validation on non-security interfaces would be of interest.

## 4. REFERENCES

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