

# Multi-Factor Authentication: Security or Snake Oil?

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# Phishing & Identity Theft





- Historically most online banking done with passwords (single-factor authentication)
- Password communicated over SSL/TLS secured channel.
- Very susceptible to phishing/pharming/malware.

# FDIC & FFIEC Recommendations





- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation & Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council:
  - all banks to have *enhanced* authentication by end of 2006.
- Note: enhanced is not the same as multi-factor

# Problems with Previous Server Authentication

- SSL is simply not understood by users
  - SSL Lock Icons & https indicators
  - Certificates, Root Certificates & Verification
  - Secure sessions, newly spawned windows
  - See yesterday's tutorial for more info
- Users cannot authenticate websites, and so give out credentials improperly.







# Address Bars






# Lock Icons



# Certificate Dialogs



- No consistency
- Can average user make heads or tails of info provided?



# What Security Problem is Being Solved?

- Do we want to prevent credential loss?
- Credit fraud or other monetary loss?
- Money laundering?
- Data loss (leading to secondary loss, privacy or full fledged ID theft )?

# How Expensive are Solutions?

- Initial Enrollment Costs
- Deployment Costs
- Support Costs
- Financial industry is phobic of any client side solutions
- If cost per transaction is not lower than teller, ignore it.

# Who are the Adversaries?

- Phishers
- Pharmers
- Crimeware
- Traditional Fraud (Family members, co-workers, etc....)

# Mutual Authentication?

- People are tricked in phishing because the website doesn't authenticate itself
  - SSL doesn't count
- Mutual Authentication may solve phishing/pharming, but what about malware?
- Session Hijacking malware exists: eGold, ABN Ambro, other unreported cases...

# Initial & Revalidation Enrollment Problems

- Strong authentication does not help if the right person isn't enrolled in the first place.
- Proper and secure initial enrollment can be expensive.
- Ditto for Revalidation
- These problems won't be addressed today, but are just as, if not more, important.



# Single Sign-on vs. Transaction Based Authentication

- Most US banks use single-sign on
  - Artifact of current authentication techniques?
- Many European banks use authentication at the transaction level.
- Transaction based authentication is the only defense against session hijacking

# 3 Keys to Authentication

- Something you .....

## 1. Know

- Passwords, challenge answers, etc..

## 2. Are

- Biometrics (all types)

## 3. Have

- Tokens, SecureID, Scratch-Pads, Cookies

# Prevention vs. Detection

- Prevention: Focus on preventing credential/information loss.
- Detection: Assume credentials will be lost, prevent stolen credentials from being misused.

Some Solutions?

# Back-end Fraud Detection System

- Risk measurement programs measure:
  - IP addresses
  - geo-graphic locations
  - packet/person travel times
  - transfers to suspect companies/countries
- Strange behavior puts stop on account
- Doesn't prevent credential loss or private data breach.



# Digital One-Time Passwords I

- RSA SecurID
- Server synched random number generator
- Numbers generated every 30-60 sec.
- Numbers effectively unpredictable
- Lost tokens use serial numbers or other challenge questions.
- Timing features makes it unlikely solution for MA or Transactions




# Digital One-Time Passwords II

- InCard Token
- Same form-factor as credit-card
- People are familiar with these
- Random number generated with button push.
- Better for MA and Transaction usability



# Grid Based One-Time Passwords I

- Grid Cards (Entrust GridAuth)
- User is issued grid of random alpha-numeric characters.
- Can be used for MA and TFA.
- User requests characters at specific grid locations for MA.
- Server requests characters for TFA



# Paper Based One-Time Passwords II

- Scratch Cards (Entrust GridAuth)
- Issued card is covered list of OTPs
- User reveals one password per use.
- Can be used for MA and TFA
- New cards must be reissued in timely fashion.



# Crypto Tokens

- Contains secret-keys, certificates and the ability to sign, verify, decrypt and/or encrypt.
- Can be used to sign username, nonce and password.
- Needs OS specific drivers
- Interface Trusted Path Issues make malware worrisome.





# Server Authentication Via Images

- A Shared Secret-Image is shown to user before password is released.
- Bank of America Site-Key
- Yahoo! Site-Seal

# Passmark Overview

- Cookie & Flash Objects installed on computer to identify it later

## Here's How SiteKey Works

By passing back and forth secret information that only you and Bank of America know, you can feel even more secure with your Online Banking experience. We recognize you and you recognize us. [Learn more](#) or [sign up now](#).



- 1 Enter your Online ID.
- 2 Click **Sign In using my SiteKey**.

Your SiteKey Image and Message:



cute dog

- 3 If we recognize your computer: We will display your SiteKey.

What was your high school mascot?

\* Answer:

- 4 If we don't recognize your computer: We will ask you one of your SiteKey Challenge Questions. After you answer your SiteKey Challenge question correctly, your SiteKey will display.

Passcode:

- 5 Once you recognize your SiteKey, you know you are at the valid Bank of America site. You can then feel safe to enter your passcode and continue to Online Banking.

To take advantage of this new security feature now, click the **Sign Up** button below. Then, just follow the simple on-screen instructions to set up your SiteKey and SiteKey Challenge Questions.

[Sign Up](#)

[Return to Customer Service](#)

 **Secure Area**

Bank of America, N.A. Member FDIC. Equal Housing Lender   
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If your SiteKey is correct, you know you are at the valid Bank of America site.

If you recognize your SiteKey, please enter your passcode and click the **Sign In** button.

An asterisk (\*) indicates a required field.

Your SiteKey:



my private message

\* Passcode:

(4-12 numbers and/or letters, case sensitive)

**Sign In**

[Forgot your SiteKey?](#)

[Incorrect SiteKey showing?](#)

[Reset passcode](#)

- Identified computers are presented with identifying image after username is supplied.

## We do not recognize your computer

We do not recognize the computer you are signing in from.

To ensure your online security, please answer your SiteKey Challenge Question. If you want us to remember this computer the next time you sign in, please check the **Yes** checkbox below. If not, please check **No**. Then click the **Continue** button.

An asterisk (\*) indicates a required field.

**What was your best childhood friend's first name?**

\* Answer:

(Not case sensitive)

\* Remember this computer next time you Sign in?

[Learn more](#)

- ☒ Yes, remember this computer  
☐ No, don't remember this computer

**Continue**

[Forgot the answer to your SiteKey Challenge Question?](#)

• Otherwise, rely on challenge questions.

 **Secure Area**

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# Knowledge Based Challenges

- Questions that only you should know the answer to?
  - Mother's Maiden Name
  - Your Elementary/Jr High/Sr High School
  - Pet's name
- Which questions are those exactly
- Used for *authentication* and Identity Reestablishment
- Which questions' answers can be data-mined
  - (i.e. facebook proof, etc....)



# Out of Band Communication

- Use out-of-band communication to deliver authenticating secret
  - Cell-Phone Texting
  - Email
  - Voice Calls

# Chase Authentication System

The screenshot shows the Chase Online login page. At the top, the Chase logo is on the left, and 'Chase.com | Privacy Policy' is on the right. Below the logo, 'Chase Online<sup>SM</sup>' is on the left and 'Wednesday, July 18, 2007' is on the right. The main heading is 'Log on from a New Computer' with a 'Help with this page' link. A progress bar shows five steps: 'Activation Code' (selected), 'Select Method', 'Confirmation', 'Enter Code', and 'My Accounts'. The text explains that a new Activation Code is required because the computer is not recognized. It provides instructions to follow the steps to get access in minutes and a link for those who already have an Activation Code. A box titled 'Log on from a New Computer' contains the instruction 'It's quick and simple. To get your Activation Code:' followed by a three-step list: 1. Tell us how to send it to you, 2. Get your code, and 3. Enter it in the space provided. At the bottom of this box are 'Next' and 'Cancel' buttons.

CHASE

Chase.com | Privacy Policy

Chase Online<sup>SM</sup> Wednesday, July 18, 2007

## Log on from a New Computer

Help with this page

Activation Code Select Method Confirmation Enter Code My Accounts

It appears you're using a different computer. - We apologize for the inconvenience, but each time you log on using a computer we don't recognize, our new security guidelines require us to give you a new Activation Code.

Please follow the steps below and you'll have access to your accounts in minutes.  
[Already have an Activation Code?](#)

### Log on from a New Computer

It's quick and simple. To get your Activation Code:

1. Tell us how to send it to you.
2. Get your code.
3. Enter it in the space provided.

Next Cancel

Cookies are placed on users' computers based on out of band communication

# Chase Authentication System

## Cont.

- Activation code delivered by choice of out-of-band communication
- Correct code and password places cookie on browser

**Get Your Activation Code**

We'll show you all contact information we have on file for you. Some of it may be outdated, but we'll only send you an Activation Code using the method you select. **Note:** For security reasons, we have hidden parts of your contact information below with "xxx." [Learn more about why we do this.](#)

Delivery Method	Send Text Message to:
Phone Call to : <input type="radio"/> xxx-xxx-4692	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="radio"/> xxx-xxx-1860	<input type="checkbox"/>
OR E-mail Message to: <input type="radio"/> sxxxxxs@indiana.edu	
OR None of the Above: <input type="radio"/> Show me more options	

**Activation Code**

Activation Code\*

Password\*

[I haven't received my Activation Code](#)

\*Required field

# Cookies


- A cookie is placed on computer, and attached to account.
- Only browsers with cookies can access account.
- Privacy concerned users turn off cookies/  
multiple browsers/computers/etc...
- Cookies can be stolen with pharming.

# Biometrics

- Measuring some property of who you are:
  - Fingerprints
  - Facial Recognition
  - Voice Recognition
  - Keystroke Dynamics


# Voice Recognition

- Low cost of entry/  
pervasiveness of mics increasing
- Adaptive vs. Non-adaptive  
templates.
- Authenticator changes: puberty,  
colds, laryngitis.
- Operating System/Driver issues.



# Facial Recognition

- Can web-cams be used/  
prevalence is quickly growing.
- Template based on specific  
measurements on face &  
resilient to daily changes in  
appearance.
- Template changes: aging, plastic-  
surgery
- Processing & bandwidth  
requirements





# Facial Recognition Challenge Problem





# Keyboard Dynamics


- Ubiquitous distribution of keyboards.
- Measure dynamics such as typing rates, speed between different keys, etc....
- Static vs. dynamic
- People use a number of different keyboards.
- OS/Driver Issues
- Unreliable if users are beginners, distracted, etc...



# Visual Keyboard



- User specifies corner during account enrollment
- User enters numbers corresponding to password
- Screen capture or keyboard logger insufficient (unless done repeatedly & in conjunction)

The screenshot shows the GridPass secure sign-in interface. At the top, it says "Enter GridCode™ for Secure Sign-In" with a "User Guide" link. Below this, there's a "New User? Sign Up for your GridPass™ Account" link. The main form has a "User Name" field with the text "richard" and a "Forgot Your Username?" link. Below the username field is the "Enter GridCode™" field, which contains the number "38955". There are "Logon" and "Manage GridPass" buttons. Below these is a numeric keypad with buttons for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, Clear, and 0. At the bottom is a "Forgot Your GridPass™" link. To the right of the form is a large grid of 100 buttons, each containing a letter (uppercase and lowercase) and a number. The grid is organized into 10 rows and 10 columns. The letters are arranged alphabetically, with uppercase letters in the first column and lowercase letters in the second column. The numbers are arranged in a specific pattern across the grid.



# GridCode Keyboard

- Enrollment: user selects corner (this does not change)
- Password entry: user inputs numbers in specified corner, corresponding to password.
- Every new authentication attempt randomizes numbers in corners.



# Extended Validation Certificates

- Primary difference between current certs is non-technical:  
  
**Identity of certificate requested is stringently checked.**
- Browsers will display different security indicators than previous certs.
- Users aren't currently being tricked because they are accepting bad certs.



# What Do We Do?

- Banks need to implement something.
- It needs to be cost effective or they can shutdown Internet Banking
  - (Bank of New Zealand)
- They needed it last year, future research is useful, but not a viable answer.
- Think *risk management* not silver-bullets.

# Research Questions

- How do we know if a security technology is unworkable or has simply been incarnated with a poor interface?
- How do we generate user studies that simulate calls to action, motivated behavior and non-suspicious users.