Smartphone Privacy & Security

USP Presentation Sakshi Garg & Bin Liu

Outline:

- Privacy and Security threats in Smartphones
- Android Permissions
- Readings
- Blackphone
- Class Activity
- Urgent Challenges
 - Malware detection
 - Fine-grained access control of resources

Privacy and security threats in Smartphones:

Privacy and security threats in Smartphones:

- Malware
- Spyware
- Vulnerable applications
- Phishing attacks
- Browser exploits
- Wi-fi sniffing
- Network exploits
- Lost or stolen device

- Impersonation
- Reselling your phone
- The data available on phone

What data do smartphones have access to?

What data do smartphones have access to?

- Contact lists
- emails
- messages
- pictures
- Videos
- phone calls
- Calendar
- Notes

- Location
- Microphone
- Bluetooth
- Reminders
- facebook
- twitter

Spy Agencies Tap Data Streaming From Phone Apps!! (Jan 27 2014)



One of several undisclosed classified document provided by Snowden.

Spy Agencies Tap Data Streaming From Phone Apps!!

- The N.S.A. and Britain's Government Communications Headquarters were working together on how to collect and store data from dozens of smartphone apps.
- The project was named "The mobile surge".
- This include applications like Angry Birds, facebook, flicker, flixster.
- Just by updating the android software, users send more than 500 lines of data about phone's history and use.

Android Permissions:

- Android permission system is intended to inform users about the risks of installing applications.
- Android users are provided with permission display that appears when users have selected an application to download.
- The display helps to understand that how the information is accessed and users can cancel the installation if permissions are excessive or objectionable



Why permissions are useless in Android?

- Users have no choice but to accept permissions to install the application.
- In most of the cases users do not understand these permissions.
- Vague and confusing terms are used.
- Difficult for users to make informed decisions while installing applications.
- There are around 130 permissions.



Reading 1 !!

Android Permissions: User Attention, Comprehension, and Behaviour

Adrienne Porter Felt, Elizabeth Ha, Serge Egelman, Ariel Haney, Erika Chin, and David Wagner.

Reading Summary !!

- 2 usability studies:
 - \circ Internet survey of 308 Android users
 - Interviewed and observed 25 Android users.
- 17% participants paid attention to permissions and 97% failed to answer comprehension questions.
- Low awareness of permission warning and comprehension.

Recommendations for improving usability of Permissions:

- Negative reviews from peer users should be provided.
- Re-organizing and re-naming categories.
- Category headings should be more relevant and convey the right purpose.
- Warnings should convey risks.
- More permissions should be classified as non-dangerous and hidden by default.

One of the biggest security risk!



Phones get lost or stolen.

How to ensure the security of your smartphone?

Mobile passwords:

PIN : Earlier versions of iphone 40% people do not use Pin in their phones

Unlock Pattern: Most of the Android Phones

Fingerprint Mechanism: iphone 5s



Blackphone



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Blackphone: Privacy and Security focused Android smartphone

- Developed by Silent circle.
- To be released in June 2014.
- 4.7-inch HD IPS screen
- >2GHz quad core CPU
- 2 GB RAM
- 16 Gb storage



What is special about this phone?

- Lets you send peer-to-peer
 Encrypted texts, Phone Calls, Video
 Calls and File transfers.
- Silent Circle Apps: provides access to internet services bypassing the government surveillance.
- Provides internet access through VPN.
- Disconnect Secure Wireless.



Android vs. PrivatOS

Feature Android Default		PrivatOS Enhancement		
Search	Trackable	Anonymous		
Bundled Apps	Many, with privacy disabled by default	Few, and all privacy-enabled		
Wi-Fi usage	Always on for geolocation and user tracking	Smart disabling of all Wi-Fi except trusted hotspots		
App permissions	All-or-nothing	Fine-grained control in a single interface		
Communications tools	Traceable dialer, SMS, MMS, browser. Vulnerable to spoofed cell networks and Wi-Fi.	Private calls, texting, video chat, file exchange up to 100MB, browsing, and conference calls		
Updates	Supplied infrequently after carrier blessing	Frequent secure updates from Blackphone directly		
Remote Wipe & Anti Theft	Requires use of centralized cloud account	Anonymous		
Business Model	Personal data mining for tracking and marketing	Delivering privacy as a premium, valued feature		

Might not be that good of an idea!!

• The cost of the phone is \$630

+

\$120 subscription yearly to use encrypted suite.

- To communicate using blackphone, the other person needs to have blackphone or use silent circle apps on their android or iPhone.
- New OS and hence higher scope of teething troubles and bugs.

Challenge: Malware

(Especially on Android)

Malicious Smartphone Application

Sensitive Information Exposure Abuse of phone services (Phone, Message)

Root Exploitation Package Repacking Update Attack



http://matemedia.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/08/android_malware_tra nsparent.png

Class Discussion

KNET: "Keep your Android device safe from malware"

Are these security measures enough?

Please find a possible attack in a security perspective.



Why so many malware apps?

Abuse of openness.

- Reduce Openness

 Review process by human, restrict APIs (iOS)
- Maintaining order

 Automatic detection
 (Google Bouncer)
- Tradeoff? Arms Race?





http://www.gaptekupdate.com/wpcontent/uploads/Android_Bouncer.jpg

Google Bouncer

Analyzing Apps on Google Play

• External network available. (:-))



http://hypeline.se/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/Android-Bouncer.png

- Run the app in an QEMU emulator for 5 minutes
- Using a Google account with made-up name & email
- Simulate UI clicks (Predictable?)
- Dynamic analysis (Static analysis as well)

https://www.duosecurity.com/blog/duo-tech-talksdissecting-the-android-bouncer

https://jon.oberheide.org/files/summercon12-bouncer.pdf

Analysis of Malware

- Dynamic Analysis
 - Run the app in simulator
 - Apply sufficient input (Measuring code coverage)
 - Create fake data / responses
 - => Slow, incomplete
- Static Analysis
 - Reverse Engineering
 - Examining unusual cases
 - Tracking data flow
 - => Weak against code obfuscation

Fighting against malware apps

Anti-malware apps

Especially for jailbroken / rooted devices



Sophisticated anti-malware analysis Side channels, etc.

http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/jiang/

http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~hchen/

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Challenge: Resource Control

Phone resource control

Fine-grained controls are **needed** "Google Map reads my contacts" "This game consume too much data traffic"

Existing Solutions iOS: Privacy Panel Android: Permissions, AppOps

PDroid, LBE, XPrivacy, PMP

iOS Privacy Settings

Android AppOps (4.3 only)

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http://0.tgn.com/d/ipod/1/0/S/O/-/-/ios-6-privacy.jpg

http://images.dailytech. com/nimage/Permission_manager_Screen shots_News.jpg

Users are overwhelmed with options! http://images.fanpop



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com/images/image uploads/Lisasimpson-angry-lisa-simpson-

Reduce Users' Burden

Predictive Better default settings Labeling only for some of the apps

Abstraction & Aggregation Answering several questions only

Crowd-powered Smart Default

ProtectMyPrivacy (PMP)



http://techtaurus.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/Protect -My-Privacy-3.2.1-v3.2.1-debios-7-cydia-tweak-for-iPhoneand-iPad.jpg

Crowd-powered Smart Default

XPrivacy: https://crowd.xprivacy.eu/

Rows marked with a grey background will be restricted when fetched; bold text means data was used

Votes *	Exceptions		
deny/allow	(yes/no)	Cl95 ±% **	Restriction
121 / 179 40%	7 / 293	5.5	accounts
171 / 125 58%	0 / 296	5.6	browser
177 / 119 60%	0 / 296	5.6	calendar
218 / 78 74%	0 / 296	5.0	calling
114 / 182 39%	0 / 296	5.5	clipboard
197 / 99 67%	0 / 296	5.3	contacts
156 / 140 53%	0 / 296	5.7	dictionary
174 / 122 59%	0 / 296	5.6	email
195 / 101 66%	0 / 296	5.4	identification
55 / 241 19%	0 / 296	4.4	internet
23 / 15 61%	0 / 38	14.9	ipc
240 / 56 81%	0 / 296	4.5	location
141 / 155 48%	0 / 296	5.7	media
192 / 104 65%	0 / 296	5.4	messages
173 / 123 58%	0 / 296	5.6	network
163 / 133 55%	0 / 296	5.6	nfc
116 / 180 39%	0 / 296	5.5	notifications
54 / 81 40%	0 / 135	8.2	overlay
227 / 69 77%	0 / 296	4.8	phone
96 / 70 58%	0 / 166	7.4	sensors
200 / 96 68%	0 / 296	5.3	shell
78 / 218 26%	0 / 296	5.0	storage
120 / 176 41%	0 / 296	5.6	system
97 / 199 33%	0 / 296	5.3	view

Facebook

We need personalization

60%

58%

54% 49%

42%

Profile 1 (25.4%)		Profile 2 (15.8%)	
😢 Call Log + 🕑 Call Monitoring	66%	😢 Positioning + 🕑 Wi-Fi / 3G	32%
😢 Call Log + 🥑 Wi-Fi / 3G	63%	😢 Positioning + 🥑 ROOT	31%
😢 Call Log + 🕑 Phone State	62%	😢 Call Log + 🕑 Wi-Fi / 3G	29%
😢 Call Log + 🕑 ROOT	61%	😢 Positioning + 🕑 Phone State	28%
😢 Call Log + 🕑 Positioning	61%	😢 Call Log + 🕑 ROOT	28%

Profile 3 (17.8%)		Profile 4 (8.8%)
😢 Positioning + 😢 Wi-Fi / 3G	86%	Positioning + 😢 Wi-Fi / 3G
😢 Positioning	85%	Positioning + 😢 ROOT
😢 Positioning + 🥑 SMS DB	83%	Positioning+ 😢 Call Monitoring
😢 Positioning + 😢 ROOT	82%	Positioning + SPhone State
😢 Positioning + 😢 Phone ID	80%	😢 Wi-Fi Network

Profile 5 (14.8%)		Profile 6 (17.2%)	
Positioning + SROOT	40%	Call Log + Call Monitoring	81%
Positioning + 3G / Wi-Fi	40%	💙 Call Log + 🕑 Wi-Fi / 3G	79%
Phone ID + ROOT	39%	✓Call Log + ✓Phone State	78%
Phone ID + 🕑 3G / Wi-Fi	39%	♥Call Log + ♥ROOT	77%
𝘎 3G / Wi-Fi + 👽 ROOT	37%	♥Call Log + ♥Phone ID	75%





Smart Default

Intelligently predict users' preferences Minimum users' burden Transparent decision making process

First step of this (shamelessly): our paper! :)

Bin Liu, Jialiu Lin, and Norman Sadeh, *Reconciling Mobile App Privacy and Usability on Smartphones: Could User Privacy Profiles Help?*, To appear in WWW'14, Seoul. <u>http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~bliu1/publications/Bin_WWW2014.pdf</u>

Thanks!